
**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
APPEAL NO. 2023-1**

T. OAK, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

WILLIAM ELM, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF RED, in his official capacity,
et al.

Defendants-Appellants.

**Appeal from the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Red State**

OPINION OF THE COURT

Before BEECH, PINE, and WALNUT, Circuit Judges.

WALNUT, Chief Judge.

At issue is whether the Equal Protection clause or the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Red State from limiting sex-transition treatments for minors experiencing gender dysphoria.

I. A. Gender Dysphoria

Before gender dysphoria had a name, the medical profession offered a variety of treatments for individuals suffering from a lack of alignment between their biological sex and perceived gender. In the 1960s and 1970s, cross-sex hormones and sex-reassignment surgeries emerged as "the option of choice" to treat the condition. Walter O. Bockting & Eli Coleman, *A Comprehensive Approach to the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria*, 5 J. Psych. & Hum. Sexuality 131, 132 (1992). A 1979 study, however, concluded these treatments did not alleviate the mental distress the condition caused, prompting providers to pull back on these forms of care. See Jeremi M. Carswell et al., *The Evolution of Adolescent Gender-Affirming Care: An Historical Perspective*, 95 Hormone Rsch. Paediatrics 649, 652 (2022). Given the "irreversibility of hormonal and surgical sex reassignment," many providers instead prioritized more holistic approaches exploring a range of options – including therapy and living as the desired gender – before considering physical interventions. Bockting & Coleman at 136; *id.* at 134, 143.

In 1979, the Harry Benjamin Society, now called the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”), published the first standards of care for treating gender dysphoria. *Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons* (1st ed. 1979). In line with the prevailing caution practiced by healthcare providers, the standards permitted hormonal and surgical interventions only for adults and only after the patients received other types of care. *Id.* §§ 4.3.4. Because hormone treatments have “some irreversible effects,” they were not permitted until an individual received therapy and lived as the desired gender for three months. *Id.* §§ 4.4.2. Invasive surgery required more. Non-genital surgeries required three months of therapy and at least six months of living as the desired gender, while genital surgeries required therapy and a full year of living comfortably as the desired gender. *Id.* §§ 5.1.2.

In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association first classified gender dysphoria as a medical condition, initially calling it “gender identity disorder” and describing it as a “persistent sense of discomfort” with one’s biological sex. DSM-III 261 (3d ed. 1980). The diagnostic criteria for adults and minors were similar but not identical. *Id.* at 261-66. Without specifying appropriate treatments for either condition, the Association cautioned that the “long-term” effects of surgery remain “unknown.” *Id.*

Over the next two decades or so, various medical organizations, most prolifically the WPATH, offered new standards of care. Throughout this period, the Association expressed caution about using medical interventions that would alter the secondary characteristics of an individual’s biological sex. The standards also recognized various non-physical treatments for gender dysphoria, including support groups, participation in recreational activities of the desired sex, cross-dressing, dressing unisexually, hair removal or application, vocal therapy, changes in grooming, breast binding, and prostheses. See *Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 21, 23, 26, 30, 35 (5th ed. 1998). During these twenty years, the Association’s standards of care continued to support hormonal and surgical treatments only for adults and not for minors. See, e.g., *Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons* § 4.14.4 (4th ed. 1990). Such treatments, the guidelines explained, are “extensive in [their] effects,” “invasive to the integrity of the human body,” and “are not, or are not readily, reversible.” *Id.* § 4.1.1.

What the medical profession has come to call gender-affirming care was not available for minors until just before 2000. In the late 1990s, healthcare workers in the Netherlands began using puberty blockers—which slow the development of male and female physical features—to treat gender dysphoria in minors. Carswell et al. at 652-53. The “Dutch Protocol” permitted puberty blockers during the early stages of puberty, allowed hormone therapy at 16, and allowed genital surgery at 18. *Id.* at 652-53.

In 1998, the WPATH revised its standards to endorse the Dutch Protocol. See *Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 19 (5th ed. 1998). The standards permitted puberty blockers, considered “reversible,” at the onset of puberty when taken in conjunction with psychotherapy. *Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 10 (6th ed. 2001). They permitted cross-sex hormones, a “partially reversible” treatment,

for those 16 or older but only after six months of therapy. *Id.* And they permitted "irreversible" surgical interventions only after the individual had lived for at least two years as the desired gender and only after they turned 18. *Id.* at 11.

In 2012, the WPATH relaxed these guidelines further. The new standards permitted cross-sex hormones for adults and minors, including minors under the age of 16. See *Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People* 19-20 (7th ed. 2012). Around this time, some American doctors began using these treatments for children. Red R.17-3 at 15.

Today, these guidelines permit the use of puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones from the early stages of pubertal development. See *Standards of Care for the Health of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8*, 23 *Int'l J. of Transgender Health* S1, S64-65 (2022) ("*2022 WPATH Guidelines*"); *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline* at 3880, 3883. Therapy or time spent living as the desired gender is no longer required before or along with such treatments. *2022 WPATH Guidelines* at S48. Many surgical treatments initially restricted to adults have become available to minors in the past six years, often without any prerequisites for therapy or cross-sex hormone treatments. See *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline* at 3894; *2022 WPATH Guidelines* at § 6.12, S66. Overall, the standards of care for minors "have become less restrictive over the course of time so fewer procedures require mental health evaluation, fewer recommendation letters are required, and more types of professionals are viewed as capable of providing such evaluations." Tonia Poteat et al., *History and Prevalence of Gender Dysphoria*, in *Transgender Medicine* 1, 14-15 (eds. Leonid Poretsky & Wylie C. Hembree, 2019).

In the last few years, the number of doctors prescribing sex-transition treatments and the number of children seeking them have grown. See *2022 WPATH Guidelines* at S43. The number of private clinics specializing in hormonal and surgical treatments, for example, has "grown from just a few a decade ago to more than 100 today." Red R.47-3 at 1. The percentage of youth identifying as transgender has doubled from 0.7% of the population to 1.4% in the past few years, while the percentage of adults (0.5% of the population) has remained constant. Carswell et al. at 653.

B. The Act and this Litigation

On March 2, 2023, Red State enacted Senate Bill 1, the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity ("the Act"). Red Code Ann. § 68-33-101 *et. seq.* Seeking to "protect[] minors from physical and emotional harm," the legislature identified several concerns about recent treatments the medical profession offers to children with gender dysphoria. *Id.* § 68-33-101(m). The legislature appreciated that gender dysphoria is a medical condition involving "distress from a discordance between" a person's perceived gender and biological sex. *Id.* § 68-33-101(c). But it was concerned some treatments for this condition "can lead to the minor becoming irreversibly sterile, having increased risk of disease and illness, or suffering adverse and sometimes fatal psychological consequences." *Id.* § 68-33-101(b). It was

concerned the long-term harms of these treatments, some potentially irreversible, remain unknown and outweigh any near-term benefits because the treatments are "experimental in nature and not supported by high-quality, long-term medical studies." *Id.* And it noted that other helpful, less risky, and reversible treatments remain available. *See id.* § 68-33-101(c).

These findings convinced the legislature to ban certain medical treatments for minors with gender dysphoria. A healthcare provider may not "administer or offer to administer" "a medical procedure" to a minor "for the purpose of" either " [e]nabling a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or "[t]reating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity." *Id.* § 68-33-103(a)(1). Prohibited medical procedures include "[s]urgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs" and "[p]rescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone." *Id.* § 68-33-102(5). The Act does not restrict these procedures for persons 18 and over. *Id.* § 68-33-102(6).

The Act contains two exceptions. It permits the use of puberty blockers and hormones to treat congenital conditions, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury. *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1) (A). And it has a continuing care exception until March 31, 2024, which permits healthcare providers to continue administering a long-term treatment, say hormone therapy, that began before the Act's effective date. *Id.* § 68-33- 103(b)(1)(B).

The Act authorizes the Red Attorney General to enforce these prohibitions. *Id.* § 68-33-106(b). It permits the relevant state regulatory authorities to impose "professional discipline" on healthcare providers that violate the Act. Red R.1 ¶ 56; see Red Code Ann. § 68-33-107. It creates a private right of action, enabling an injured minor or nonconsenting parent to sue a healthcare provider for violating the law. Red Code Ann. § 68-33-105(a)(1)-(2). And it extends the statute of limitations for filing such lawsuits to 30 years after the minor reaches 18. *Id.* § 68-33-105(e).

Three transgender adolescents and their parents sued Red officials, claiming the Act's bans on puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sex-transition surgery for children violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal protection. Each minor was receiving puberty blockers, hormone therapy, or both as treatment for gender dysphoria when they sued. All say the care has provided considerable comfort to them.

The district court concluded that the Act was facially unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Red appealed. This court stayed the injunction pending appeal. We now address the Constitutional claims on their merits.

II. Legislative Activity in Other Jurisdictions

Constitutionalizing new areas of American life is not something federal courts should do lightly, particularly when "the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful" debates about the issue. *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). And

that sort of thoughtful debate is going on now in this country. By our count, twenty States have laws similar to those in Red State, all of recent vintage. See Ala. Code § 26-26-4; Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-1502(a); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R.64B8- 9.019; Ga. Code Ann. § 31-7-3.5; Idaho Code § 18-1506C; Ind. Code § 25-1-22-13; Iowa Code § 147.164; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372. La. Stat. Ann. § 40:1098 (effective Jan. 1, 2024); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-141-1-9; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 191.1720; S.B. 99, 68th Leg., 2023 Sess. (Mont. 2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-7301-07; H.B. 808, 2023 Sess. (N.C. 2023); N.D. Cent. Code. § 12.1-36.1-02; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2607.1; H.B. 1080, 98th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2023); S.B. 14, 88th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2023); Utah Code Ann. § 58-68-502(1)(g); W. Va. Code § 30-3-20 (effective Jan. 1, 2024). At least fourteen other States, meanwhile, provide various protections for those seeking treatments for gender dysphoria, all too of recent vintage. See Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2023- 12; Cal. Penal Code § 819; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12- 30-121(1)(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-571n, 54-155b; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/28-10; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11 et seq.; Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2023.08; Minn. Stat. § 260.925; N.J. Exec. Order No. 326; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-4; N.Y. Educ. § 6531-b(2); H.B. 2002, 82nd Leg., 2023 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2023); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 150; 472 Wash. Rev. Code § 7.002.002. *472.

Most of this legislative activity occurred within the last two years. Failure to allow the Act to go into effect would start to grind these all-over-the-map gears to a halt. Given the high stakes of these policy deliberations—the long-term health of children facing gender dysphoria—sound government usually benefits from more rather than less debate, more rather than less input, more rather than less consideration of fair-minded policy approaches. To permit legislatures on one side of the debate to have their say while silencing legislatures on the other side of the debate under the Constitution does not further these goals. That is even more critical in view of two realities looming over this case—the concept of gender dysphoria as a medical condition is relatively new and the use of drug treatments that change or modify a child's sex characteristics is even more recent. Prohibiting citizens and legislatures from offering their perspectives on high-stakes medical policies, in which compassion for the child points in both directions, is not something federal judges should do without a clear Constitutional warrant.

III. A. Due Process

"No State," the Fourteenth Amendment says, shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision over time has come to secure more than just procedural rights. It also requires heightened scrutiny for substantive protections "against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720. Courts identify such rights by looking for norms that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." *Id.* at 721 (quotation omitted). The most deeply rooted tradition in this country is that we look to democracy to answer pioneering public-policy questions, meaning that federal courts must resist the temptation to invoke an unenumerated guarantee to "substitute" their views for those of legislatures. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.*, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2228, 2277 (2022) (quotation omitted). Aptly mindful of the reality that substantive due process is "a treacherous field," *Moore v. City of E.*

Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977), and appreciative of the risk that comes with it—loss of democratic control over public policies the people never delegated to the judiciary—the federal courts have become ever more "reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process" to new areas, *Collins v. City of Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).

No such expansion is warranted here. This country does not have a "deeply rooted" tradition of preventing governments from regulating the medical profession in general or certain treatments in particular, whether for adults or their children. Rather, state and federal governments have long played a critical role in regulating health and welfare, which explains why their efforts receive "a strong presumption of validity." *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); see *Kottmyer v. Maas*, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (14th Cir. 2006). State governments have an abiding interest "in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession," *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731, and "preserving and promoting the welfare of the child," *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (quotation omitted). These interests give States broad power, even broad power to "limit[] parental freedom," *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944); see *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584 (1979), when it comes to medical treatment, cf. *Watson v. Maryland*, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).

This opening presumption of legislative authority to regulate healthcare gains strength in areas of "medical and scientific uncertainty." *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007); see also *Marshall v. United States*, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1984). In that setting, courts face two risks of error, not just one—first, that they will assume authority over an area of policy that is not theirs to regulate and, second, that they will impose a constitutional straightjacket on legislative choices before anyone knows how that "medical and scientific uncertainty" will play out.

There is a long tradition of permitting state governments to regulate medical treatments for adults and children. So long as a federal statute does not stand in the way and so long as an enumerated constitutional guarantee does not apply, the States may regulate or ban medical technologies they deem unsafe. See *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 574-75, 581 (2009) (vaccine labels); *Vacco v. Quill*, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (assisted suicide); *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996) (pacemaker design); *Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990) (withdrawal of life support).

Washington v. Glucksberg puts a face on these points. 521 U.S. 702. Harold Glucksberg claimed that Washington State's ban on physician-assisted suicide violated his patients' due process rights. *Id.* at 707-08. The Court disagreed. It allowed the State to prohibit individuals from receiving the drugs they wanted and their physicians wished to provide, all despite the "personal and profound" liberty interests at stake and all despite the reality that the drugs at issue often could be used for other purposes. *Id.* at 725-26. The Court reasoned that there was no "deeply rooted" tradition of permitting individuals or their doctors to override contrary state medical laws. *Id.* at 727. The right to refuse medical treatment in some settings, it reasoned, cannot be "transmuted" into a

right to obtain treatment, even if both involved "personal and profound" decisions. *Id.* at 725-26. Nor did the observation that some rights under the Due Process Clause arose from concern over "personal autonomy" lead to the conclusion that "any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected." *Id.* at 727. Even as Glucksberg lost his challenge to the Washington law, the Court's decision did not curtail the nationwide "earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide." *Id.* at 735. Rather, its decision "permit[ted] this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." *Id.*

Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach hews to this path. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc). The claimant was a public interest group that maintained that terminally ill patients had a constitutional right to use experimental drugs the FDA had not yet deemed safe and effective. *Id.* at 697. As these "terminally ill patients and their supporters" saw it, the Constitution gave them the right to use experimental drugs in the face of a grim health prognosis. *Id.* at 697-701. How, they claimed, could the FDA override the liberty of a patient and doctor to make the cost-benefit analysis of using a drug for themselves given the stark odds of survival the patient already faced? *Id.* at 700-01. The D.C. Circuit rejected the claim. The decision invoked our country's long history of regulating drugs and medical treatments, concluding that substantive due process has no role to play. "Our Nation's history and traditions," the decision explained, "have consistently demonstrated that the democratic branches are better suited to decide the proper balance between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology and are entitled to deference in doing so." *Id.* at 713; see *id.* at 710-11 & n.18 (collecting similar cases).

Just so here. "The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults." *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 168. A parent's right to make decisions for a child does not sweep more broadly than an adult's right to make decisions for herself. See *Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977); *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pub. Health Tr.*, 696 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New Jersey*, 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting "a right of parents to demand the State make available a particular form of treatment").

Parental rights do not alter this conclusion because parents do not have a constitutional right to obtain reasonably banned treatments for their children. Plaintiffs counter that, as parents, they have a substantive due process right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). At one level of generality, they are right. Parents usually do know what's best for their children and in most matters (where to live, how to live, what to eat, how to learn, when to be exposed to mature subject matter) their decisions govern until the child reaches 18. But becoming a parent does not create a right to reject democratically enacted laws. The key problem is that plaintiffs overstate the parental right by climbing up the ladder of generality to a perch—in which parents control all drug and other medical treatments for their children—that the case law and our traditions simply do not support. Level of generality is everything in constitutional law, which is

why the Court requires "a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721 (quotation omitted).

So described, no such tradition exists. The government has the power to reasonably limit the use of drugs, as just shown. If that's true for adults, it's true for their children, as also just shown. This country does not have a custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments in the process. Any other approach would not work. If parents could veto legislative and regulatory policies about drugs and surgeries permitted for children, every such regulation—there must be thousands—would be good law until one parent in the country opposed it. At that point, either the parent would take charge of the regulation, or the courts would. And all of this in an arena—the care of our children—where sound medical policies are indispensable and most in need of responsiveness to the democratic process.

Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health & Human Services does not alter this conclusion. 927 F.3d 396 (14th Cir. 2019). A Michigan law required healthcare organizations to collect blood samples from newborns and to store the samples for future use, all without parental consent and all without any explanation why the law advanced the health of the babies. *Id.* at 403-04. This compulsory storage program, we held, violated nonconsenting parents' rights "to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." *Id.* at 418. But there is a night and day difference between that program and this one. The Michigan program *compelled* medical care, while the Act *restricts* medical care. It is one thing for the State to impose a procedure on someone; it is quite another to deem it unsafe and prohibit it. This is why the laws at issue here, in marked contrast to the Michigan law, rest on the legislative judgment that they will protect "the health of the child." *Id.*, 927 F.3d at 421; see Red Code Ann. § 68-33-101(b). While our longstanding traditions may give individuals a right to refuse treatment, there is no historical support for an affirmative right to specific treatments. See *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 725-26.

Other courts have drawn the same sensible line, noting a material distinction between the State effectively sticking a needle in someone over their objection and the State prohibiting the individual from filling a syringe with prohibited drugs. The cases simply do not support the claimants' position. They "reject[] arguments that the Constitution provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments reasonably prohibited by the Government." *Abigail All.*, 495 F.3d at 710 & n.18 (collecting cases); see *Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psych.*, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000); see also *Lambert v. Yellowley*, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (rejecting affirmative right to prescribe a drug even when physician attests that use of the treatment is "both advisable and necessary"). In some situations, governments may impose medical treatments on unwilling patients, but the exceptional settings of these cases confirm their limited scope. See *Jacobson v. Massachusetts*, 197 U.S. 11, 27-32 (1905) (permitting municipal health authorities to require vaccination in the face of threats to public health); *Sell v. United States*, 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003) (allowing

the government to administer antipsychotics against a patient's wishes so that he could stand trial on "serious criminal charges").

Parham v. J. R. does not help the claimants either. 442 U.S. 584. Georgia empowered parents to commit their children to state mental institutions. *Id.* at 587, 605. Several minors sued, claiming that their "liberty interest in not being confined" cut back on any parental right to make decisions for a child. *Id.* at 600. The claim was resolved on procedural, not substantive, due process grounds. *See id.* at 599-600, 620. Recognizing that States possess "constitutional control over parental discretion," the Court held that States must provide "some kind of inquiry"—a classic procedural due process form of relief—to guard against "the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care." *Id.* at 603, 606. This traditional due process ruling does not support today's untraditional request for relief under substantive due process. Nothing in *Parham* supports an affirmative right to receive medical care, whether for a child or an adult, that a state reasonably bans. *See Cruzan*, 497 U.S. at 286-87 (noting that *Parham* "allowed" a state to credit parents' health decisions but did not create "a constitutional requirement" that a state "recognize such decisionmaking").

The plaintiffs insist these treatments are not new and do not involve experimental care. Even if that were true, that alone does not give parents a fundamental right to acquire them. If it acts reasonably, a state may ban even longstanding and nonexperimental treatments for children. It is difficult, at any rate, to maintain that these treatments have a meaningful pedigree. It has been about a decade since the WPATH, the key medical organization plaintiffs rely upon, first said hormone treatments could be used by all adolescents, no matter how young. And some of the same European countries that pioneered these treatments now express caution about them and have pulled back on their use. How in this setting can one maintain that long-term studies support their use—and that the Constitution requires it? Until more time has passed, it is difficult to gauge the risks to children—whether by physically transitioning as a child or not—making it reasonable for accountable democracies to consider, reconsider, and if need be reconsider again the best approach to these issues.

What about the reality that the best time to treat gender dysphoria, according to some doctors and some parents, may be before a child goes through puberty? The nature of the condition, the plaintiffs urge, turns on a lack of alignment between a child's biological sex and perceived gender, a mismatch that will increase during puberty and a mismatch that could make surgery more likely if the condition persists. We see the point. But we also see why this concern gets to the nub of the regulatory challenge, one illustrated by the shifting standards of care over the last two decades and one confirmed by the accepted reality that these drug treatments come with "both risks and benefits." *See Cal. Amicus Br. 15.* Changing the sex characteristics of a child's body, in short, carries material risks in either direction. States may reasonably exercise caution in these circumstances, with some States focusing on the near-term risk of increasing the symptoms of gender dysphoria and other States focusing on the irreversible risks of providing such care to a minor. The Due Process Clause does not resolve this regulatory debate.

Invocation of medical associations and other experts in the medical community does not alter this conclusion. The plaintiffs separately frame their claim as the right of parents "to obtain established medical treatments" for their children, emphasizing the many medical organizations that now support this treatment for adults and minors. Red R.2 ¶ 80. At least three problems stand in the way of accepting this argument. One is that the plaintiffs never engage with, or explain how they meet, the "crucial" historical inquiry to establish this right. *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721. There is no such history or tradition.

A second problem is that the relevant medical and regulatory authorities are not of one mind about the cost-benefit tradeoffs of this care. Consider the work of the Food and Drug Administration, an agency whose existence is premised on a form of medical expertise of its own. Under a highly reticulated process that requires considerable long-range testing, the FDA determines when new drugs are safe for public use, including use by minors, and when new drugs are safe for certain purposes but not others. In making these decisions, the Constitution rarely has a say over the FDA's work. *Abigail All.*, 495 F.3d at 703. Gender-transitioning procedures often employ FDA-approved drugs for non-approved, "off label" use, and Red decided such off-label use in this area presents unacceptable dangers. Red Code Ann. § 68-33-101(b), (e), (g). Many medical professionals and many medical organizations may disagree. But the Constitution does not require these two States to view these treatments in the same way as the majority of experts or to allow drugs for all uses simply because the FDA approved them for others. *Cf. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region v. Taft*, 444 F.3d 502, 505 (14th Cir. 2006) (off-label use is legal "[a]bsent state regulation").

It is difficult to maintain that the medical community is of one mind about the use of these hormones for gender dysphoria when the FDA is not prepared to put its credibility and testing protocols behind the use. What is new, evolving, and conflicting often prompts change and eventually leads to different best practices, something the Constitution facilitates rather than handcuffs. Also diverse are the practices of other nations, so much so that amicus States on both sides claim support in foreign approaches, with one group emphasizing that the European countries who initiated these treatments are having second thoughts and raising the bar for using them, with the other group emphasizing that these countries have not yet completely banned the treatments. *Compare* Ala. Amicus Br. 21-24, *with* Cal. Amicus Br. 20 & n.39.

The third problem is the absence of judicially manageable standards for ascertaining whether a treatment is "established" or "necessary." *Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause*, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019). One of the *amicus curiae* briefs supporting the plaintiffs forthrightly invokes three goals of the medical profession—"autonomy," "beneficence," and "justice"—as a source of guidance in the area. Bioethics Br. 16. Even the most unwieldy and subjective balancing tests offer more guidance than these generalized principles.

Recognizing such a right also would mean that the state and federal legislatures would lose authority to regulate the healthcare industry whenever the subject of regulation—

the medical profession and drug companies—found such regulation unnecessary or otherwise inconsistent with autonomy, beneficence, and justice. See *EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear*, 920 F.3d 421, 438-39 (14th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a similar argument). Put to the side the risks of placing the subjects of regulation in charge of regulation, how would judges know when these rights came into existence? The best evidence of the correct standard of care, plaintiffs say, comes from the standards adopted by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health. See T. Oak Appellees' Br. 4-5; Doe Appellees' Br. 7-8. But the Act largely mirrors those standards of care—at least it did so for most of the time gender dysphoria has been a diagnosable condition. Not until 2012, remember, did the Association remove any age limits on hormone treatments. *Compare Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders* 10 (14th ed. 2001) (setting threshold of "as early as age 16"), *with Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People* 20 (7th ed. 2012) (removing age limit).

What if past is precedent—and this association and others change course in the future? Would the States' authority reappear at that point? What is it in the Constitution, moreover, that entitles experts in a field to overrule the wishes of elected representatives and their constituents? Is this true in other areas of constitutional law? Must we defer to a consensus among economists about the proper incentives for interpreting the impairment-of-contracts or takings clauses of the Constitution? Or to a consensus of journalists about the meaning of free speech? Or even to a consensus of constitutional scholars about the meaning of a constitutional guarantee?

Question after question arises under plaintiffs' approach. And answer after answer confirms that expert consensus, whether in the medical profession or elsewhere, is not the North Star of substantive due process, lest judges become spectators rather than referees in construing our Constitution. See *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2267 (criticizing use of "the 'position of the American Medical Association'" to indicate "the meaning of the Constitution"); *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2005) (explaining that Congress may prohibit marijuana use even when doctors approve its use for medical purposes); *EMW Women's*, 920 F.3d at 439 (reasoning that a state's "authority to regulate" does not turn on consistency with the "views of certain medical groups"); *Otto v. City of Boca Raton*, 981 F.3d 854, 869 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the "institutional positions [of medical associations] cannot define the boundaries of constitutional rights"). The plaintiffs do not establish a due process violation.

B. Equal Protection

"No state," the Fourteenth Amendment says, "shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Under this guarantee, laws ordinarily are valid if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. *San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). Laws premised on protected classifications, such as sex or race, receive heightened review. See *United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute*, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) ("VMI"); *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña*, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995). Through it all, a

law that treats individuals "evenhandedly"—that treats like people alike—does not trigger heightened review. *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 800.

This Act treats similarly situated individuals evenhandedly. Contrary to the plaintiffs' claims, the Act does not classify anyone on the basis of sex. The Act regulates sex-transition treatments for all minors, regardless of sex. No minor may receive puberty blockers or hormones or surgery to transition from one sex to another. Red Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.372(2). Such an across-the-board regulation lacks any of the hallmarks of sex discrimination. It does not prefer one sex over the other. See *Reed*, 404 U.S. at 73, 76 (preferring male executors). It does not include one sex and exclude the other. See *Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (denying entry to men); *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 519-20 (denying entry to women); *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (excluding potential jurors based on sex). It does not bestow benefits or burdens based on sex. See *Michael M. v. Super. Ct.*, 450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981) (plurality opinion) (making "men alone criminally liable" for statutory rape); *Orr v. Orr*, 440 U.S. 268, 27 (1979) (requiring men, but not women, to pay alimony). And it does not apply one rule for males and another for females. See *Sessions v. Morales-Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 58 (2017) (setting one immigration "rule for mothers, another for fathers"); *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976) (allowing women under 21 to buy beer but not men under 21). By guarding against the risks of physically invasive, often irreversible, changes to a child's secondary sex characteristics until the individual becomes an adult, the law does not trigger any traditional equal-protection concerns. And by limiting access to sex-transition treatments to "all" children, the bans do not "constitute[] a denial of 'the equal protection of the laws.'" *Palmer v. Thompson*, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971); accord *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 800; *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974). There thus is no reason to apply any form of heightened scrutiny review to this law.

References to a child's biological sex in the law does not alter this conclusion. Plaintiffs counter that the Act treat minors differently based on sex because a boy with abnormally low testosterone levels could receive a testosterone booster in adolescence, but a girl could not receive testosterone to transition. Likewise, a girl could receive estrogen to remedy a genetic condition, but a boy could not receive estrogen to transition. In this way, the plaintiffs claim, the availability of cross-sex hormone treatments implicates the minor's sex.

We accept the premise but not the conclusion. It is true that, by the nature of their biological sex, children seeking to transition use distinct hormones for distinct changes. But that confirms only a lasting feature of the human condition, not that all lawmaking in the area is presumptively invalid. One year ago, and nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court explained that laws regulating "medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo" ordinarily do not "trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny." *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245-46; see *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the

members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation.").

Just so with the banned hormone treatments. Testosterone transitions a minor from female to male, never the reverse. So only females can use testosterone as a transition treatment. Estrogen transitions a minor from male to female, never the reverse. So only males can use estrogen as a transition treatment. These treatments, by biological necessity, are "medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo." *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245. If a law restricting a medical procedure that applies only to women does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as in *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, the Act, which restricts medical procedures unique to each sex, also does not require such scrutiny.

Another flaw accompanies this argument. It assumes any administration of these hormones is one treatment. Not so. Using testosterone or estrogen to treat gender dysphoria (to transition from one sex to another) is a different procedure from using testosterone or estrogen to treat, say, Klinefelter Syndrome or Turner Syndrome (to address a genetic or congenital condition that occurs exclusively in one sex). These distinct uses of testosterone and estrogen stem from different diagnoses and seek different results. Because the underlying condition and overarching goals differ, it follows that the cost-benefit analysis does too, permitting States to legislate in the area without the assumption that they have presumptively violated the Constitution. States may permit varying treatments of distinct diagnoses, as the "Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." *Tigner v. Texas*, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 808.

The Act mentions the word "sex," true. But how could it not? The point of the hormones is to help a minor transition from one gender to another, and laws banning, permitting, or otherwise regulating them all face the same linguistic destiny of describing the biology of the procedures. If any reference to sex in a statute dictated heightened review, virtually all abortion laws would require heightened review. See *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2285-2300 (listing numerous laws regulating abortion that refer to sex). Skeptical review also would extend to statutes that regulate medical procedures defined by sex. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 116(a)(1) (criminalizing "female genital mutilation"); Red Code Ann. § 7-51-201(d)(1) (testicular cancer); *id.* § 56-7-2354(a) (prostate cancer); *id.* § 68-58-101 (breastfeeding); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.315(11)(b) (death benefits for prostate cancer, testicular cancer, and cervical cancer). None of these laws is presumptively unconstitutional.

One simply cannot define, or create, a protected class *solely* by the nature of a denied medical benefit: in this instance childhood treatment for gender dysphoria. Else every medical condition, procedure, and drug having any relation to biological sex could not be regulated without running the gauntlet of skeptical judicial review. Far from "command[ing] 'dissimilar treatment for [boys] and [girls] who are similarly situated,'" *Frontiero*, 411 U.S. at 688. (quotation omitted), Red treats boys and girls exactly the same for constitutional purposes—reasonably limiting potentially irreversible procedures until they become adults.

What is true for the word "sex," if plaintiffs' and the federal government's arguments were accepted, also would be true for the word "gender." That would mean any State opting to address treatments for "gender dysphoria," whether in a permissive or less permissive way, would trigger heightened review. Recall the fourteen States that statutorily permit some treatments in this area. One of them requires medical insurance companies to cover treatments for gender dysphoria if the patient is 16 or older. Would heightened review apply just because the words sex or gender appear in the law? Would courts then have the final say over whether the cut-off should be 14 or 15? For equal protection purposes, as opposed to conversational purposes, a law does not "*classif[y]* based on sex" whenever it "uses sex-related language." *Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala.*, 80 F.4th 1205 (11th Cir. 2023) (Brasher, J., concurring). In this instance, the legally relevant classifications turn on presumptively valid age and medical conditions.

The key to the constitutionality of the Act, moreover, has nothing to do with groups; it's that it does not disadvantage "persons" based on their sex. The availability of testosterone, estrogen, and puberty blockers does not turn on invidious sex discrimination but on the age of the individual and the risk-reward assessment of treating this medical condition (as opposed to another) with these procedures. Confirming the point is the remedy the plaintiffs seek. They do not ask Red to equalize treatment options by making a procedure given to one sex available to the other. They want both sexes to receive the same gender-transitioning care. In other words, the outcome is that both sexes get a type of care or neither one does. The plaintiffs in this case, in contrast to the plaintiffs in the jury cases or for that matter the race-based-exclusion cases, do not claim a sex-discrimination right to hormones if it is denied for all children for all treatments. See *Eknes-Tucker*, 80 F.4th at 1233-34 (Brasher, J., concurring) (observing that an injunction against a similar law would "not require the government to treat boys and girls the same" but would force the State "to *either* ban puberty blockers and hormones for all purposes *or* allow them for all purposes").

Plaintiffs' sex-classification argument, moreover, does not work on its own terms. Recall that Red prevents minors from taking cross-sex hormones *and* puberty blockers for the purpose of transitioning. In contrast to cross-sex hormones, puberty blockers involve the same drug used equally by gender-transitioning boys and girls. See *2022 WPATH Guidelines* at S113 (recommending the use of gonadotropin releasing hormone agonists (GnRHa) as puberty blockers and explaining how GnRHa blocks puberty in boys and girls); Red R.113-4 at 18-19 ("Even the dosing is the same for males and females"). That shows plaintiffs' only remedial request—the elimination of bans on cross-sex hormones *and* puberty blockers—does not match their sex-classification theory.

What of language in the cases saying that "all" sex-based classifications receive heightened review? *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 555 (quoting *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 136); see *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 724-25. The laws in those cases used sex classifications to bestow unequal treatment on men and women. See *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 519 (excluding female applicants); *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 719 (excluding male applicants). Those cases show only that the

government cannot classify individuals by sex when doing so perpetuates invidious stereotypes or unfairly allocates benefits and burdens. *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 131, 137 (striking potential jurors "based on gender stereotypes").

But those harms, and the necessity of heightened review, will not be present every time sex factors into a government decision. As we have already shown, heightened review does not apply in the context of laws that regulate medical procedures unique to one sex or the other. See *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245-46; *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. Likewise, the government does not trigger heightened review when it houses men and women separately at a prison without making distinctions in funding or programming available to members of each sex. Cf. *Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrs. v. District of Columbia*, 93 F.3d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The same is true of a sex-based decision to place urinals only in men's rooms. So too with this Act. Its necessary references to "enduring" differences between men and women do not trigger heightened review. *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533.

If plaintiffs and the federal government were correct that the only material question in a heightened review case is whether a law contains a reference to sex or gender, the Court would have said so in invalidating bans on same-sex marriage in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). But it did not. The Court indeed did not even apply heightened review to the laws. *Id.* at 663-76. Mere appearance of the words sex or gender in a law does not by itself require skeptical review under the Constitution.

Bostock does not alter this conclusion. Moving from constitutional to statutory cases, the plaintiffs and the federal government invoke a Title VII case, *Bostock v. Clayton County*, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731(2020). The Court concluded that Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimination "because of ... sex" covers gay and transgender individuals. *Id.* at 1743; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). But that text-driven reasoning applies only to Title VII, as *Bostock* itself and many subsequent cases make clear. *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (declining to "prejudge" other discrimination laws); *Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318, 324 (14th Cir. 2021) (refusing to apply *Bostock* to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); *Meriwether v. Hartop*, 992 F.3d 492, 510 n.4 (14th Cir. 2021) (reasoning Title VII analysis does not apply to Title IX).

Differences between the language of the statute and the Constitution supply an initial reason why one test does not apply to the other. Title VII focuses on but-for discrimination: It is "unlawful ... for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Equal Protection Clause focuses on the denial of equal protection: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "That such differently worded provisions"—comparing the Constitution and Titles VI and VII—"should mean the same thing is implausible on its face." *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.*, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (distinguishing the Equal Protection Clause from Title VI); see *id.* at 2209 (concluding Title VI and Title VII's terms are "essentially identical"); see *Eknes-Tucker*, 80 F.4th at 1229 (majority op.) ("Because *Bostock* therefore concerned a different law

(with materially different language) and a different factual context, it bears minimal relevance to the instant case."). All of this explains why Title VII covers disparate impact claims, *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), and the Fourteenth Amendment does not, see *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).

Even aside from the differences in language between this statute and the Constitution, there is a marked difference in application of the anti-discrimination principle. In *Bostock*, the employers fired adult employees because their behavior did not match stereotypes of how adult men or women dress or behave. In this case, the Act does not deny anyone general healthcare treatment based on any such stereotypes; it merely denies the same medical treatments to all children facing gender dysphoria if they are 17 or under, then permits all these treatments after they reach the age of majority. A concern about potentially irreversible medical procedures for a child is not stereotyping.

Plaintiffs object to this conclusion on several grounds. They counter that two cases show these different texts have the same meaning. The first says only that cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause "are a useful starting point in interpreting [Title VII]." *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976). That point does little for the plaintiffs who try to use Title VII in the other direction—to interpret the Constitution. What is more, Congress ultimately disagreed with the Court's observation, amending Title VII to negate *Gilbert's* extension of equal protection precedent. See *Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1983).

The second case—*Smith v. City of Salem*—does little in word or deed. 378 F.3d 566 (14th Cir. 2004). It briefly and inconclusively says that claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII involve the "same elements." *Id.* at 577 (quoting *Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch.*, 314 F.3d 271, 275 (14th Cir. 2003)). But *Smith* never addresses the textual differences between these documents—or the different stakes of broadly reading a statute versus broadly reading the U.S. Constitution. All the cases pre-date *Bostock*. And nearly all concern workers with overlapping employment-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., *Lautermilch*, 314 F.3d at 275. But a case about potentially irreversible medical procedures available to children falls far outside Title VII's adult-centered employment bailiwick.

The *Smith* decision's outcome has even fewer parallels to today's case. Jimmie Smith, a transgender firefighter, began "expressing a more feminine appearance" at work. *Smith*, 378 F.3d at 568. Smith was fired soon after. Smith "alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind [the decision]." *Id.* at 572. Based on this sex-stereotyping theory, the court found Smith alleged violations of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. See *id.* at 577. That holding was not the watershed plaintiffs make of it. *Smith* did not purport to break new ground, see *id.* at 571, or to create a new rule for transgender discrimination, *id.* at 570. Our subsequent cases have largely taken the hint, refusing to extend *Smith* beyond claims about discrimination over dress or appearance—something the Act does not regulate. See *Chisholm v. St. Mary's City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 947 F.3d 342, 352 (14th Cir. 2020); *Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.*, 453 F.3d 757, 764 (14th Cir. 2006).

Smith tells us nothing about whether a state may regulate medical treatments for minors facing gender dysphoria. Recognizing and respecting biological sex differences does not amount to stereotyping—unless Justice Ginsburg's observation in *United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute* that biological differences between men and women "are enduring" amounts to stereotyping. 518 U.S. at 533. Any other approach to *Smith* would nullify *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, which to repeat make clear that legislative references to biological differences do not by themselves require heightened review. See *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2245-46. The Eleventh Circuit recently, and correctly, reached this precise conclusion in distinguishing a similar stereotyping case. See *Eknes-Tucker*, 80 F.4th at 1229-30 (11th Cir. 2023) (reasoning Alabama's ban on sex-transition procedures "does not further any particular gender stereotype" and "simply reflects biological differences").

C. The Act Withstands Rational Basis Scrutiny

The Act does not draw constitutionally irrational lines. Even under deferential review, the plaintiffs contend, they should prevail because banning puberty blockers and hormones for some purposes and not for other purposes is irrational. Confirming the point, they say, is the Court's determination that it was irrational for states to deny contraception to single individuals but not to married couples. See *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438, 447-53 (1972). The analogy does not hold. Marital status by itself has nothing to do with the risks associated with pregnancy, which doomed the *Eisenstadt* law. See *id.* Not so with the dividing line here. A legislature could conclude that treating congenital conditions with puberty blockers and hormones carries less risk than using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria for the purpose of changing an individual's secondary sex characteristics. Drawing such lines "is peculiarly a legislative task." *Murgia*, 427 U.S. at 314. The State also could be concerned that some adolescents, say a 13-year-old, lack the capacity to consent to such a significant and potentially irreversible treatment.

The unsettled, developing, in truth still experimental, nature of treatments in this area surely permits more than one policy approach, and the Constitution does not favor one over the other. This ongoing debate provides "persuasive evidence" that Red could choose fair-minded caution and its own approach to child welfare, just as other jurisdictions could rationally adopt another path. *Trump*, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.

Plaintiffs rely on the district court's endorsement of their position and evidence to question the State's interests. But the district court ruled that heightened review applied to these classifications. As shown, that would require an extension of existing Supreme Court and Fourteenth Circuit precedent, an extension not justified in this setting. Rational basis review applies, and it requires deference to legislatures, not to medical experts or trial court findings. At any rate, no such deference applies to a written record like this one and the dueling affidavits accompanying it. See *Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers, Inc.*, 52 F.3d 1373, 1381 (14th Cir. 1995) ("[I]n a case such as this, where the district court's decision was made on the basis of a paper record,

without a[n] evidentiary hearing, we are in as good a position as the district judge to determine the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction.")

Plenty of rational bases exist for this law, with or without evidence. Rational basis review requires only the possibility of a rational classification for a law. *FCC v. Beach Commc'ns*, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). It does not generally turn on after-the-fact evidentiary debates. *Id.* at 315. But even if we account for the evidence submitted at the preliminary injunction hearing, Red offered considerable evidence about the risks of these treatments and the flaws in existing research. Administering puberty blockers to prevent pubertal development can cause diminished bone density, infertility, and sexual dysfunction. Introducing high doses of testosterone to female minors increases the risk of erythrocytosis, myocardial infarction, liver dysfunction, coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, hypertension, and breast and uterine cancer. And giving young males high amounts of estrogen can cause sexual dysfunction and increases the risk of macroprolactinoma, coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, cholelithiasis, and hypertriglyceridemia.

The challengers disagree, citing experts of their own. But no one disputes that these treatments carry risks or that the evidence supporting their use is far from conclusive. See *Eknes-Tucker*, 80 F.4th at 1216-18, 1224-25; Doe Appellees' Br. 44-45; T. Oak Appellees' Br. 35-36. The Endocrine Society's guidelines recognize that puberty blockers can cause "adverse effects on bone mineralization" and "compromised fertility," along with "unknown effects on brain development." *Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline* at 3882. The WPATH likewise cautions that hormone therapy can impair fertility, and it notes the "major gaps in knowledge" in this area. *2022 WPATH Guidelines* at S103, S118. At bottom, the challengers simply disagree with the State's assessment of the risks and the right response to those risks. That does not suffice to invalidate a democratically enacted law on rational-basis grounds.

IV. Conclusion

Gender dysphoria is a relatively new diagnosis with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age limits for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing the Constitution should be humble and careful about announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.

For these reasons, we reverse the preliminary injunction and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
APPEAL NO. 2023-1**

T. OAK, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellee

v.

WILLIAM ELM, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF RED, in his official capacity,
et al.

Defendants-Appellants

**Appeal from the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Red State**

DISSENT

PINE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The statute we consider today discriminates based on sex and gender conformity and intrudes on the well-established province of parents to make medical decisions for their minor children. Despite these violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority concludes the statute is constitutional and reverses a district court's order enjoining it. I respectfully dissent.

I. A. Gender Dysphoria

At birth, an infant is assigned a sex, either male or female. An assignment is usually based on the appearance of external genitalia, although the term *sex*, as used in the medical community, also comprises other things, such as internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary sex characteristics. *Gender identity*, in contrast, "is the medical term for a person's internal, innate sense of belonging to a particular sex." No. 23-5609, R. 17-1, PID 148. Assigned sex and gender identity match for most individuals, but for transgender individuals, they do not align.

For a small segment of the population, incongruity between assigned sex and gender identity can result in *gender dysphoria*, a medical condition characterized by significant psychological distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. The condition is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Version 5 (DSM-5), the diagnostic and coding compendium for mental-health professionals, and

can arise during childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. If untreated, gender dysphoria may result in severe anxiety and depression, eating disorders, substance-use issues, self-harm, and suicidality.

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) and the Endocrine Society have published clinical-practice guidelines on how best to treat gender dysphoria. The WPATH is the leading association of medical and mental-health professionals with expertise in treating gender dysphoria, and the Endocrine Society represents more than 18,000 endocrinologists. The groups are the largest professional associations in the United States in their respective fields. The first set of guidelines dates to 1979, and the organizations have revised the guidelines several times since.

The goal of treatment for gender dysphoria is to reduce distress and improve functioning by enabling an affected person to live in conformity with the person's gender identity, and the process of undergoing such treatment is often called *gender transition* or *gender-affirming care*. The precise treatment for gender dysphoria depends on an individual's medical and mental-health circumstances and age—whether the individual is a pre-pubescent child, an adolescent, or an adult.

Transition typically starts with a series of steps known as *social transition*. These often include using a name and pronouns, wearing clothes, and practicing grooming habits associated with the person's gender identity. Beginning with adolescence, a healthcare provider may recommend medical interventions, including prescription medications. Minors often experience intensification of gender dysphoria when entering adolescence due to the development of secondary sex characteristics, such as facial and body hair for males and breasts for females. Providers do not consider these interventions until the onset of puberty.

Under the WPATH and the Endocrine Society guidelines, an adolescent may receive medical interventions only if the adolescent: (1) has gender incongruence that is both marked and sustained over time; (2) meets the diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria; (3) demonstrates sufficient emotional and cognitive maturity to provide informed consent for the treatment; (4) actually provides such consent with the adolescent's parents after being informed of the potential reproductive and other side effects; and (5) has no mental-health concerns that may interfere with diagnosis or treatment. The guidelines "recommend health care professionals involve the relevant disciplines, including mental health ... professionals, to reach a decision about whether" gender-affirming care is "appropriate and remain[s] indicated throughout the course of treatment until the transition is made to adult care." No. 23-5600, R. 113-9, PID 1792.

Treatment may consist of puberty-suppressing medications and hormone therapy. Pubertal suppression prevents the worsening of gender dysphoria by limiting the development of secondary sex characteristics and is appropriate only if the adolescent's gender dysphoria has worsened with the onset of puberty. Hormone therapy—testosterone for adolescent transgender boys and testosterone suppression and estrogen for adolescent transgender girls—also reduces distress by facilitating

physiological changes consistent with the adolescent's gender identity and on a similar timeline as the adolescent's non-transgender peers.

A substantial body of evidence—including cross-sectional and longitudinal studies as well as decades of clinical experience—shows that these medical interventions work. Gender-affirming care improves short-and long-term outcomes for adolescents with gender dysphoria by reducing rates of depression, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidality, and brings their mental health into alignment with their peers. Adverse side effects, moreover, are infrequent, and healthcare providers can easily manage them. Providers have used puberty suppressants to treat precocious (or early) puberty for decades, and suppressants have no long-term effects on fertility or sexual functioning. Suppression is also reversible; if treatment ceases, endogenous puberty normally resumes. Hormone therapy likewise is safe and poses a low risk of side effects or adverse consequences. The percentage of individuals who later come to regret undergoing such care is low—only about one percent.

The WPATH and the Endocrine Society guidelines constitute the prevailing standard of care for individuals with gender dysphoria. They are based on the same quality of evidence as other clinical-practice guidelines. And every professional association for medical and mental-health providers in the United States—including the American Medical Association, American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Psychiatric Association—has endorsed the guidelines.

B. The Act and This Litigation

Plaintiffs are transgender adolescents T. Oak, John Doe, and Ryan Roe (Minor Plaintiffs), their parents Samantha and Brian Williams, Jane and James Doe, and Rebecca Roe (Parent Plaintiffs). All Minor Plaintiffs were undergoing gender-affirming care when Red's statute took effect. All have benefitted from their care.

T. Oak, a fifteen-year-old transgender girl, first began to question her gender identity when she was ten years old. She felt like she was "trapped" or "drowning" and found it hard to focus in school or connect with her friends. No. 23-5600, R. 22, PID 196-97. She started getting sick at school and routinely developed urinary tract infections because she was not using the restroom out of distress with the sex-separated facilities. T. Oak saw a therapist, who diagnosed her with gender dysphoria. T. Oak began puberty at age thirteen, and the prospect of changes like a deeper voice and facial hair terrified her. Thus, her physician at Arboretum Children's Hospital (ACH) discussed treatment options, including puberty suppressants and, later, hormone therapy. T. Oak and her parents decided that treatment was right for her. Now, T. Oak is a happy, confident, outgoing teenager.

Ryan Roe is a fifteen-year-old transgender boy. By the time he entered the fifth grade, he had begun puberty and became depressed and anxious. He had a panic attack when he had his first period. In the sixth grade, Ryan often vomited from anxiety in the morning before school, and his distress persisted despite treatment with anti-anxiety

medication. Ryan's peers bullied him. He stopped talking in public because of the sound of his voice and began engaging in self-harm. Two years of psychotherapy provided Ryan minimal benefit, and after the seventh grade, his therapist diagnosed him with gender dysphoria. Ryan and his parents consulted with an endocrinologist at ACH, and after months of weighing the benefits and risks of treatment, Ryan elected to undergo hormone therapy. Treatment transformed Ryan's life: he has returned to his vocal, outgoing self, raises his hand in school, and willingly joins in family photographs.

John Doe is a twelve-year-old transgender boy. He knew that he was a boy beginning when he was two or three years old. When John was three or four years old, he adopted a typically male name and began telling his friends that he was a boy. Participating in sex-separated activities with girls made him miserable; he was upset playing on an all-girls soccer team, and he asked his mother why he could not wear the boy's outfit or dance the boy's part in his dance classes and recitals. During first grade, John started seeing a therapist, who diagnosed him with gender dysphoria. When John was nine, his mom gave him the female version of *The Care and Keeping of You*, a book designed to teach children about the changes that their bodies undergo in adolescence. John became mortified of the prospect of female puberty. His pediatrician referred him to an endocrinologist to explore treatment options. The endocrinologist monitored John for years, and once John began puberty, John and his parents decided that puberty suppression was the best course for John. Because of treatment, John has "finally" arrived at a "healthy, happy place," and when the time is right, he hopes to begin hormone therapy. No. 23-5600, R. 24, PID 212-13.

Plaintiffs reiterate the arguments they made to the district court: The Act is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates based on sex and gender conformity and under the Due Process Clause because it denies parents the fundamental right to make medical decisions for their children. I conclude the Plaintiff's arguments are valid, and the Act is unconstitutional.

II. A. Equal Protection

"'[O]ur Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,' ... a history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications today." *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (quoting *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion)). "[T]he party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification." *Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting *Kirchberg v. Feenstra*, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). "The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" *Id.* (quoting *Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.*, 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). This standard is known as "intermediate scrutiny." *Clark v. Jeter*, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).

I conclude the Act triggers heightened scrutiny because it facially discriminates based on a minor's sex as assigned at birth and on a minor's failure to conform with societal expectations concerning that sex, and Red fails to show an exceeding persuasive justification or close means-ends fit for its classification.

1. The Act Discriminates on the Basis of Sex and Gender Non-Conformity

Equal-protection jurisprudence is clear: When a "challenged [statute] expressly discriminates among [persons] on the basis of gender, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 723 (citing *Reed v. Reed*, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)). Express discrimination, or a facial classification, exists if the statutory language requires reference to a person's sex to determine whether some activity is permitted or prohibited. See *Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982) (noting that a law is not "facially unrelated to race" because it "dealt in explicitly racial terms"). "A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification." *Wayte v. United States*, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) (citing *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). Put simply, if a statute facially "provides that different treatment be accorded to [persons] on the basis of their sex," the statute necessarily "establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." *Reed v. Reed*, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); see also *Latta v. Otter*, 771 F.3d 456, 480 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring) ("A law that facially dictates that a man may do X while a woman may not, or vice versa, constitutes, without more, a gender classification.").

It is just as clear that a classification based on gender stereotypes triggers heightened scrutiny. See *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 138 (concluding that the government's use of peremptory jury strikes based on the presumption that the potential jurors' views corresponded to their sexes was unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny). And this court held nearly twenty years ago that differential treatment because a person "fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender" is "[s]ex stereotyping," *Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (14th Cir. 2004), and "easily constitute[s] a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution," *id.* at 577. Further, just three years ago, the Supreme Court confirmed that if the government treats differently "a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in a[] [person] identified as female at birth," or vice versa, the person's "sex plays an unmistakable ... role." *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741-42 (2020).

The Act classifies based on a minor's sex as assigned at birth. Red prohibits medical procedures when sought to "[e]nabl[e] a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to "[t]reat[] purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity." Red Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a). Thus, "medical procedures that are permitted for a minor of one sex are prohibited for a minor of another sex." 73 F.4th at 422 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 669 (8th Cir. 2022)). "[A] person identified male at birth could receive testosterone therapy to

conform to a male identity," for example, "but a person identified female at birth could not." *Id.*; see also *Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd.*, 57 F.4th 791, 801 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) ("The School Board's bathroom policy requires 'biological boys' and 'biological girls'—in reference to their sex determined at birth—to use either bathrooms that correspond to their biological sex or sex-neutral bathrooms. This is a sex-based classification.").

The Act also conditions the availability of procedures on a minor's conformity with societal expectations associated with the minor's assigned sex. It bars treatment when sought "for the purpose of" inducing physiological changes, like secondary sex characteristics, that are "inconsistent with" how society expects boys and girls to appear. Red Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a). A minor assigned the male sex at birth cannot, for example, obtain puberty suppressants or estrogen to attain a feminine appearance, but a minor assigned the male sex at birth and born with intersex traits may obtain treatments to induce changes "consistent with" maleness. See Red Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a) (exempting treatment for a "congenital defect.") A classification like this—motivated by perceptions of "typically male or typically female 'tendencies'"—is the kind of "generalization[]" at which courts must "take a 'hard look.'" *United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute*, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996) ("VMI") (citation omitted).

The Act accordingly "penalizes" treatment for a minor "identified as male at birth" but "tolerates" the same treatment for a minor "identified as female at birth," *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1741, and vice versa. That is a facial classification, pure and simple.

2. The Majority's Equal Protection Analysis is Wrong

Since sex and gender conformity each "play[] an unmistakable ... role," *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1742, in determining the legality of a medical procedure for a minor, the Act should raise an open-and-shut case of facial classification subject to intermediate scrutiny. Yet the majority concludes otherwise.

The majority first reasons that "no [classification] occurs" in the Act because it "regulate[s] sex-transition treatments for all minors, regardless of sex," and "no minor may receive puberty blockers or hormones or surgery in order to transition from one sex to another." This reasoning invokes an "equal application" principle, which was once acceptable in the Supreme Court's equal-protection jurisprudence, see *Pace v. Alabama*, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (upholding a statutory scheme that punished interracial fornication and adultery more severely than intra-racial fornication and adultery because "[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same"), *overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida*, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). But the Court has since rejected that principle—emphatically and repeatedly.

In *Loving v. Virginia*, the Court held unconstitutional anti-miscegenation laws that applied to black and white persons alike. In so doing, the Court "reject[ed] the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious

racial discriminations." 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). The key, the Court said, was that "[t]he statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races." *Id.* at 11. Because the statutes "rest[ed] ... upon distinctions drawn according to race," "the Equal Protection Clause demand[ed] that [the] classifications ... be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny.'" *Id.* (citation omitted). Just as the illegality of a marriage under the statutes in *Loving* hinged on a person's race, so too here does the legality of medical procedures hinge on a person's sex.

The Supreme Court has confirmed in numerous post-*Loving* cases, moreover, that laws that classify on suspect lines do not escape heightened scrutiny despite "evenhandedly" classifying all persons. In *Powers v. Ohio*, the Court "reject[ed] ... the view that race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection scrutiny because members of all races are subject to like treatment," namely, "that white jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other jurors." 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). "The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons," the Court stated, "is no more authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem." *Id.* (citing *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). "This idea has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree." *Id.*; see also *J.E.B.*, 511 U.S. at 146 (extending the holding of *Powers* to "discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender").

The Court in *Johnson v. California* again rejected the notion that a classification escapes heightened review if the classification applies "equally" to all. There, the Court considered a state department of corrections' policy of temporarily segregating new prisoners based on race to allow assessment of a prisoner's danger predicated on the risk of interracial violence between race-based gangs. See 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005). The department argued "that its policy should be exempt from" strict scrutiny "because it is 'neutral'—that is, it 'neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more than any other group or individual.'" In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply because all prisoners are 'equally' segregated." *Id.* at 506 (citation omitted). The Court disagreed, noting its "repeated command that 'racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally'" and its rejection of "the notion that separate can ever be equal—or 'neutral'—50 years ago in *Brown v. Board of Education*." *Id.* (citations omitted).

The majority also reasons that statutes "regulating 'medical procedure[s] that only one sex can undergo' ordinarily do not 'trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.'" (alteration in original) (quoting *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.*, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2245-46 (2022)). The majority invokes "distinctions involving pregnancy," which do not trigger heightened scrutiny unless shown to be "mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other." *Id.* (quoting *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)). "Testosterone transitions a minor from female to male," and "[e]strogen transitions a minor from male to female, never the reverse," the majority says, and "[i]f a law restricting a medical procedure that applies only to women does not trigger heightened scrutiny, as in *Dobbs* and *Geduldig*, this law

that restricts these medical procedures unique to each sex do not require such scrutiny either." *Id.* at 26.

This contention misreads *Geduldig* and *Dobbs*, which merely reiterated *Geduldig's* language. At issue in *Geduldig* was a state disability-insurance program that excluded coverage for "any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy." 417 U.S. at 489. The Court determined that "[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics," thus the program "[d]id not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely remove[d] one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities." *Id.* at 496, 94 S.Ct. 2485 n.20. The Court also rejected the argument that a facial classification based on pregnancy was necessarily a proxy for sex- or gender-based discrimination. See *id.*

The Act, by contrast, expressly references a minor's sex and gender conformity—and uses these factors to determine the legality of procedures. Further, discrimination based on inconsistency between gender identity and sex as assigned at birth can be seen as a proxy for discrimination against transgender individuals, which "necessarily" is discrimination "because of sex," *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1744—just like "[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews," *Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic*, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993); see also *Rice v. Cayetano*, 528 U.S. 495, 514-15 (2000) (treating discrimination on the basis of Hawaiian ancestry as a facial race classification because "ancestry [was] a proxy for race"); *Castaneda v. Partida*, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (concluding discrimination in jury procedure based on "Spanish surnames" was "not racially neutral with respect to Mexican-Americans"); *Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez*, 561 U.S. 661, 689, (2010) ("[Supreme Court] decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in th[e] context [of sexual orientation discrimination].").

To further support the majority's contention that heightened review does not apply, the majority gives as an example that the government may "house[] men and women separately at a prison" if it does not "mak[e] distinctions in funding or programming available to members of each sex." I do not read *Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia* as supporting the majority's position. There, the D.C. Circuit considered an equal-protection challenge to the District of Columbia offering fewer programs to its female than its male inmates, not the separation of inmates based on sex. See 93 F.3d 910, 923-24 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court did not address what level of scrutiny applied, or whether the programming survived scrutiny, because the resolution of the case depended on the "[t]he threshold inquiry" whether the female and male inmates were "similarly situated." *Id.* at 924. The court said the inmates were not, noting in particular "the striking disparities between the sizes of the prison populations." *Id.* at 925. "It is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination, that the smaller correctional facility" where the women were housed "offered fewer programs than the larger one" where the men were housed. *Id.* at 925. Indeed, the court favorably cited its earlier precedent, *Pitts v. Thornburgh*, see *id.* at 926, which held that "heightened scrutiny," not the deferential rational-basis review, applied when reviewing the

incarceration of female inmates at facilities significantly farther from the District than similarly situated male inmates, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

The majority also argues that, "in invalidating bans on same-sex marriage in *Obergefell v. Hodges*," the Supreme Court "would have said"—but "did not" say—that laws with sex- or gender-based conditions trigger heightened scrutiny if such scrutiny did, in fact, apply. True, the Court did not specify in *Obergefell* the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny. But the Court's silence is just that—silence. We should be wary of reading much (if anything) into the Court's resolution of the issues presented there without discussion of the applicable level of scrutiny. The Court held that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause all the same. See 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015). Laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex relationships include notable similarities to the law at issue here—they condition the availability of something (marriage versus medical procedures) based on a person's sex. And the Court subsequently clarified in *Bostock* that "it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual ... without discriminating against that individual based on sex," 140 S. Ct. at 1741, despite, for example, Justice Kavanaugh's contention in dissent that, in *Obergefell* and other cases, "the Court never suggested that sexual orientation discrimination is just a form of sex discrimination," *id.* at 1832 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

The majority further concludes that decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, like *Bostock*, do not control today's decision. Its reasoning rests on "[d]ifferences [in] the language"—Title VII makes it "unlawful ... for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of ... sex," while the Equal Protection Clause bars a state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." To be sure, Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are not identical. The former forbids sex- or gender-based discrimination (subject to certain defenses), for example, while the latter allows such discrimination if the classification satisfies heightened scrutiny. *Cf. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.*, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (distinguishing Title VI's categorical bar on discrimination based on race, color, or national origin and the Equal Protection Clause's requirement of strict scrutiny).

But the majority does not explain why or how any difference in language requires different standards for determining whether a facial classification exists in the first instance. Indeed, Supreme Court decisions under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause imply the opposite, often citing one another. See, e.g., *Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1976) (noting that "court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause ... are a useful starting point" for Title VII "concepts of discrimination" given "the similarities between [Title VII] and some of those decisions" in extending *Geduldig* to the Title VII context).

Our decision in *Smith v. City of Salem* also forecloses the majority's position. Plaintiff "Smith—biologically and by birth a male—[wa]s a transsexual and ha[d] been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder ('GID')," an earlier name for gender dysphoria. 378 F.3d at

568. "After being diagnosed with GID, Smith began 'expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis'—including at work [at a municipal fire department]—in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID." *Id.* That feminine appearance, Smith alleged, led to adverse employment action. *See id.* at 569. This court concluded that Smith had a viable Title VII claim: "[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination directed against [a woman], who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman." *Id.* at 575 (discussing *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). And these facts in support Smith's "claims of gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII easily constitute[d] a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause." *Id.* at 577; *see also Boxill v. O'Grady*, 935 F.3d 510, 520 (14th Cir. 2019) ("We review § 1983 discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause using the same test applied under Title VII.").

The majority's attempts to distinguish *Smith* are unpersuasive. "*Smith* never addresses the textual differences between these documents—or the different stakes of broadly reading a statute versus broadly reading a largely unamendable constitution"—the majority says. For reasons already discussed, neither the "textual differences" nor "the different stakes" affect the preliminary question whether a facial classification exists. And regardless of whether the majority's "arguments" about the persuasiveness of *Smith's* reasoning "have merit," *Smith* "remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the ... decision." *Dingle v. Bioport Corp.*, 388 F.3d 209, 215 (14th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

The majority next says that "[a]ll of the cases [that *Smith* relied on] pre-date *Bostock*," "[a]nd nearly all concern workers with overlapping employment-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause," while "a case about [medical treatments] available to children falls far outside Title VII's adult-centered employment bailiwick." Why does the vintage of the authorities that *Smith* cites or the employment-versus-medical context matter for determining whether a facial classification exists at all? The majority does not explain. And if anything, *Bostock* reinforces the validity and applicability of *Smith*.

Then, the majority asserts that "[o]ur subsequent cases have largely taken the hint, refusing to extend *Smith* beyond claims about discrimination over dress or appearance," citing *Chisholm v. St. Mary's City School District* and *Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center* in support. *Id.* The majority misapprehends both cases. *Chisholm* concluded that a coach's comments that athletes were "pussies" and not tough enough did not constitute "sex stereotyping." 947 F.3d 342, 351 (14th Cir. 2020). "Toughness, while sometimes celebrated in men, is certainly not discouraged in women, especially in a professional or team setting." *Id.* at 352. And the coach "was not offering a commentary on whether [the athletes] were exemplars of their sex"; in his "somewhat boorish mind, a 'pussy' was a wimp or coward, perhaps a 'snowflake' in the current lexicon, but, critically, not a feminine individual." *Id.* *Vickers* held that the plaintiff's "claim fail[ed] because [he] has failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any

observable way at work." 453 F.3d 757, 764 (14th Cir. 2006). "[T]he harassment [at issue] [wa]s more properly viewed as harassment based on [his] perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity." *Id.* at 763. After *Bostock*, however, that conclusion is dubious. See 140 S. Ct. at 1741 ("[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual ... without discriminating against that individual based on sex.").

Finally, the majority asserts that "*Smith* tells us nothing about whether a State may regulate medical treatments for minors facing gender dysphoria." "Recognizing and respecting biological sex differences does not amount to stereotyping—unless Justice Ginsburg's observation in *United States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute* that biological differences between men and women 'are enduring' amounts to stereotyping." *Id.* (quoting 518 U.S. at 533). But the existence of "enduring" "[p]hysical differences between men and women," 518 U.S. at 533, bears on whether a sex- or gender-based classification *survives* scrutiny—it cannot render a facial classification sex- or gender-neutral. See *id.* (mentioning "enduring" differences in explaining that "[t]he heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification"); *Nguyen v. INS*, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001) (subjecting a classification that "takes into account a biological difference between" mothers and fathers to intermediate scrutiny).

3. The Act Fails Intermediate Scrutiny

Because the Act facially classifies based on sex and gender conformity, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Under that standard, the "burden ... rests entirely on the" government to come forward with an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for the classification. *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533. The government satisfies its burden "only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting *Wengler*, 446 U.S. at 150). "If the State's objective is legitimate and important," the question is "whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present." *Id.* at 725. "The purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." *Id.* at 725-26.

The Act fails intermediate scrutiny. To start, it lacks an exceedingly persuasive justification. "The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented *post hoc* in response to litigation." *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533. "[T]he mere recitation of a benign ... purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." *Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld*, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); see also *Sessions v. Morales-Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 69-70 (2017) (rejecting that the government's proffered justification actually motivated the challenged sex-based classification). Here, Red's statute includes legislative findings proclaiming the state's "interest in encouraging minors to appreciate their sex, particularly as they undergo

puberty." Red Code Ann. § 68-33-101(m). And the Act's text effectively reveals that its purpose is to force boys and girls to *look* and *live* like boys and girls. Statutes, like this one, that "rel[es] on overbroad generalizations about" how "males and females" should appear and behave, *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 533, cannot survive scrutiny. Even taking Red's word that their purpose is solely to protect minors, see Red Appellants Br. 44, the state still fails to show that "the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present," *Hogan*, 458 U.S. at 725 (quoting *Wengler*, 446 U.S. at 150). The district court made robust factual findings based on an extensive record. Neither this district court, nor any district court confronting similar laws outside this circuit, has found that banning these treatments is beneficial to minors. I defer to these factual findings and, on my review of the record, see no error, clear or otherwise.

Gender-affirming care is well accepted as treatment for gender dysphoria. The WPATH and the Endocrine Society, the two most prominent organizations in transgender healthcare, have promulgated widely accepted clinical-practice guidelines for treatment. Red tries to discredit these guidelines by noting that the conclusions therein are based on "low-quality evidence" under the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) system, a formal process for assessing the quality of scientific evidence. See Red Appellants Br. 14. But "[r]ecommendations for pediatric care made by professional associations in guidelines are seldom based on well-designed and conducted randomized controlled trials due to their rarity." No. 23-5600, R. 30, PID 293. And, in any event, the GRADE system permits drawing conclusions based on "low-quality evidence," and doing so is neither novel nor uncommon. For example, about twenty percent of the American Heart Association's recommendations in its Guideline for Pediatric Basic and Advanced Life Support are strong recommendations based on evidence of similar quality.

Other courts have relied on these guidelines. See, e.g., *Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that "[m]ost courts agree" that WPATH guidelines "are the internationally recognized guidelines for the treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria" and collecting cases). And, as the Ninth Circuit noted in *Edmo*, the medical profession does as well:

[M]any of the major medical and mental health groups in the United States—including the American Association, the American Student Association, the Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Family Practice Association, the Endocrine Society, the National Association of Social Workers, the American Academy of Plastic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, the HIV Medicine Association, the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Physician Assistant Caucus, and Mental Health America—recognize the [guidelines] as representing the consensus of the medical and mental health communities regarding the appropriate treatment for transgender and gender dysphoric individuals.

Id.

The record also supports that, over the short- and long-term, gender-affirming care benefits adolescents with gender dysphoria. It reduces rates of depression, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidality. Further, providers have used puberty suppressants and hormone therapy for years to treat other conditions, so the side effects are well known—as well as infrequent and easily managed.

In short, the "actual state purposes" undergirding the statutory classifications here, *VMI*, 518 U.S. at 535, rested on improper generalizations about boys and girls. And "[a] purpose genuinely to" protect children "is not served by" the classifications, *id.* at 539-40. "That is not *equal* protection." *Id.* at 540.

B. Due Process

"The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint." *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). "The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." *Id.* at 720. This protection encompasses "two categories of substantive rights": "rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments" and "a select list of fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution." *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2246. "In deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories, the Court has long asked whether the right is 'deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition' and whether it is essential to our Nation's 'scheme of ordered liberty.'" *Id.* (quoting *Timbs v. Indiana*, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019)). The "substantive component" of due process "forbids the government to infringe [recognized] 'fundamental' liberty interests *at all*, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement" satisfies strict scrutiny—that is, the infringement "is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

Unlike the majority, I conclude that the Act violates the Due Process Clause because it prohibits Parent Plaintiffs from deciding whether their children may access medical care that the state leaves available to adults. The Act thereby infringes on the Parent Plaintiffs' fundamental right to control medical choices for their children, a right deeply rooted in this nation's history and protected as a matter of Supreme Court and binding circuit precedent.

1. The Act Violates Due Process by Interfering with Parents' Fundamental Right to Make Medical Decisions for Their Children

"Substantive due process" is "a treacherous field." *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting *Moore v. East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). As cautioned in *Dobbs*, courts "must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what [the Fourteenth] Amendment protects with [their] own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy." *Id.* Accordingly, "the Court has long been 'reluctant' to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution." *Id.* (quoting *Collins v. Harker Heights*, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).

Despite this hesitancy, the Court has found clarity in some areas. "[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court." *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also *Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("[It is] plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.'" (quoting *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972))); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); *Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary*, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[T]hose who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.").

Thus, we have squarely held that "[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." *Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.*, 927 F.3d 396, 418 (14th Cir. 2019). In *Kanuszewski*, we considered a Michigan program under which the state collected and stored blood samples from newborns to test for diseases. See *id.* at 404. We concluded that qualified immunity shielded state employees from the parent plaintiffs' claims regarding the initial collection, see *id.* at 415-16, but that the ongoing storage without informed consent violated the parents' fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, see *id.* at 418-21.

Kanuszewski flows naturally from the Court's parental-autonomy decisions. "[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is 'the mere creature of the State' and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally 'have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.'" *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Pierce*, 268 U.S. at 535). "Surely," the Supreme Court has noted, "this includes a 'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice." *Id.* "The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions," *id.*, and "historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children," *id.* (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law). Here, no one can seriously doubt whether Parent Plaintiffs and others like them are motivated by "natural bonds of affection" and their children's "best interests."

In *Parham*, the petitioner "sought a declaratory judgment that Georgia's voluntary commitment procedures for children under the age of 18 ... violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and requested an injunction against their future enforcement." *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 588. The Court applied its balancing test from *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), for procedural due-process claims,

concluding that "the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry should be made by a 'neutral factfinder' to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied" and that Georgia's procedures were constitutional. 442 U.S. at 606 (quoting *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).

Much of the Court's analysis focused on the rights and role of parents in American society as caretakers for their children. "[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized," but "[t]he statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in *all* cases because *some* parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition." *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603. "Simply because the decision of a parent ... involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state. The same characterizations can be made for a tonsillectomy, appendectomy, or other medical procedure." *Id.* Ultimately, "[p]arents *can and must make those judgments.*" *Id.* (emphasis added).

Applying these principles, the Act plainly intrudes on parental autonomy in violation of Parent Plaintiffs' substantive due-process rights. Although this case presents issues at the center of political controversies, the legal analysis on this point is rather simple. "Parents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 418. Red's statute prohibits parents from deciding whether medical treatment otherwise available to adults is appropriate for their minor children. And given that the statutes fail intermediate scrutiny, they fail strict scrutiny as well.

2. The Majority's Due Process Analysis is Wrong

The majority thinks differently, finding that the Act does not intrude on any deeply rooted right of Parent Plaintiffs.

The majority begins by framing the issue as whether "[t]his country [has] a 'deeply rooted' tradition of preventing governments from regulating the medical profession in general or certain treatments in particular" and concludes " [q]uite to the contrary." It notes that "governments have long played a critical role in regulating health and welfare," including "the integrity and ethics of the medical profession," (quoting *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 731), and "medical treatment," and that such regulations "receive 'a strong presumption of validity,'" (quoting *Heller v. Doe*, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). Accordingly, the majority reasons, "[t]he government has the power to reasonably limit the use of drugs," and "[i]f that's true for adults, it's assuredly true for their children. . . . A parent's right to make decisions for a child does not sweep more broadly than an adult's right to make decisions for herself." In short, " [t]his country does not have a custom of permitting parents to obtain banned medical treatments for their children and to override contrary legislative policy judgments in the process."

The majority's focus on the government's power over medical treatment in general misses the mark. It is true, as the majority says, that the government has wide latitude to regulate the public's access to medical treatments or providers without having to go through the wringer of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 723-27 (holding that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide); *Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that there is no "fundamental right of access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs"); see also *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) ("The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty."). But Red did not ban treatment for adults and minors alike; they banned treatment for minors *only*, despite what minors or their parents wish. Thus, the issue is not the *what* of medical decision-making—that is, any right to a *particular* treatment or a *particular* provider. Rather, the issue is the *who*—who gets to decide whether a treatment otherwise available to an adult is right or wrong for a child? Do parents have the right to make that call, or does the government get to decide for itself, notwithstanding the parents' determinations of what is in their children's best interests?

Once the issue is properly framed, the answer becomes clear: parents have, in the first instance, a fundamental right to decide whether their children should (or should not) undergo a given treatment otherwise available to adults, and the government can take the decision-making reins from parents only if it comes forward with a sufficiently convincing reason to withstand judicial scrutiny. That conclusion is faithful to our holding in *Kanuszewski* that "[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." 927 F.3d at 418. And it comports with the Supreme Court's admonition that "parents generally 'have the right, coupled with the high duty, ... to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice.'" *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602 (quoting *Pierce*, 268 U.S. at 535).

The majority's reasoning to the contrary is unconvincing. It says that "there is a night and day difference between th[e] program" in *Kanuszewski* and the statutes here because "[t]he Michigan program *compelled* medical care, while the Act *restricts* medical care. It is one thing for the State to impose a procedure on someone; it is quite another to deem it unsafe and prohibit it." The court in *Kanuszewski* never framed the right as solely to deny unwanted care. Yet it very easily could have. After all, the court noted elsewhere in its analysis that a competent person has a separate "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment," 927 F.3d at 414 (quoting *Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health*, 497 U.S. 261, 277(1990)), and that any such right for minors "devolve[s] upon the parents or legal guardians of the children," *id.* at 415, since "[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves," *id.* at 414-15 (quoting *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)). But instead of framing the parental right as one to refuse unwanted care for the child, the court said that "[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children," 927 F.3d at 418—period. It makes little sense to read the right as nothing more than a veto of forced treatment.

The majority further says that "*Parham v. J. R.* does not help [Parent Plaintiffs] either" because at issue in *Parham* were the minor plaintiffs' "procedural, not substantive, due process" rights. However, the Court said, in no uncertain terms, that a parent has the "right" and "'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice" on behalf of the child. 442 U.S. at 602. This language concerning a parent's "right" and "high duty," moreover, was a quote from *Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary*, a substantive due-process decision on the parental right to send a child to a private instead of a public school, see 268 U.S. at 534-36. In fact, every other case cited in that paragraph of *Parham* was a substantive due-process decision. See 442 U.S. at 602 (citing *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 166; *Meyer*, 262 U.S. at 400). Clearly, the Court in *Parham* was expounding the substantive due-process right of parents to direct their children's medical care, although the discussion was in the context of addressing the minor plaintiffs' procedural due-process claims.

To be sure, none of this is to say "that parents' control over their children is without limit." *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 419. As noted, "a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603. The state may, therefore, prohibit a parent from submitting a child to a genuinely harmful treatment. See, e.g., *Pickup v. Brown*, 740 F.3d 1208, 1223, 1232, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that parents had no fundamental right to give children a "treatment that the state has *reasonably* deemed harmful" given "the well-documented" and "overwhelming consensus" "of the medical and psychological community that" sexual orientation change efforts therapy "was harmful and ineffective" (emphasis added)), *abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra*, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); *Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J.*, 783 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (adopting *Pickup's* holding).

But a state cannot simply deem a treatment harmful to children without support in reality and thereby deprive parents of the right to make medical decisions on their children's behalf. Allowing the state to do so is tantamount to saying there is no fundamental right. Cf. *Schall*, 467 U.S. at 265 ("[I]f parental control falters, the State must play its part as *parens patriae*." (emphasis added)); *Prince*, 321 U.S. at 166 (noting "that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside *first* in the parents" (emphasis added)). A fundamental right backed up by strict scrutiny demands more. "Of course [judges] are not scientists, but neither may [they] abandon the field when government officials ... infringe a constitutionally protected liberty. The whole point of [heightened] scrutiny is to test the government's assertions." *S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2021) (statement of Gorsuch, J.). Our nation's constitutional history teaches that, when a treatment option remains otherwise available to the public, legislatures should not decide whether that treatment is right or wrong for minor children; parents should make these decisions.

III. Conclusion

The heated political debate over gender-affirming care has yielded varying laws throughout our country. In the normal course, the Constitution contemplates the states acting as laboratories of democracies to resolve the controversies of the day differently. See *New State Ice Co v. Liebmann*, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

But when a fundamental right or freedom from discrimination is involved, experimentation has no place. "The very purpose of" our constitutional system "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." *W. Va. St. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Our "fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." *Id.* Similarly, "[n]o plebiscite can legalize an unjust discrimination." *Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assemb.*, 377 U.S. 713, 736 n.29 (1964) (citation omitted).

Red's law tells minors and their parents that the minors cannot undergo medical care because of the accidents of their births and their failure to conform to how society believes boys and girls should look and live. The Act further deprives the parents—those whom we otherwise recognize as best suited to further their minor children's interests—of their right to make medical decisions affecting their children in conjunction with their children and medical practitioners. For these reasons, I dissent.

**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
APPEAL NO. 2024-2**

T. OAK, et al.

Petitioners

v.

WILLIAM ELM, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF RED, in his official capacity,
et al.

Respondents

**On Petition for Certiorari from the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth Circuit**

ORDER GRANTING CERTIORARI

T. Oak, et al.'s petition for an order of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit is GRANTED. Oral argument shall occur on October 24, 2024, in Crawfordsville, Indiana, and be limited to the following issues:

Whether Red State Senate Bill 1 ("the Act"), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Red Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), (1) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or (2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Petitioners shall open and close the argument.

FOR THE COURT
Joe Arborist, Clerk of Court